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DIGITAL EVIDENCE AS A MEANS OF PROOF BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Marco Roscini1
Abstract: This article discusses the use of digital evidence as a means of proof before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The absence of specific Court rules and 
procedures for digital evidence (with the exception of Practice Direction IX bis) is not 
necessarily an obstacle to its production and evaluation before the ICJ, as the general 
evidentiary rules can also be applied to digital evidence. The article first looks at the 
rules on the production of documentary evidence and then examines the specific issues 
related to audiovisual evidence. Finally, it examines the admissibility of digital evidence 
unlawfully obtained by a litigant through unilateral transborder access to data. The 
article concludes that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the specific way 
in which authenticity and accuracy of digital evidence are to be established, the 
particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is 
doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.
Keywords: International Court of Justice, international courts and tribunals, dispute 
settlement, means of proof, digital evidence, international procedural law.
1. Introduction
‘Evidence’ is ‘information … with a view of establishing or disproving alleged facts’.2 
It is different from ‘proof’ in that ‘“proof” is the result or effect of evidence, while 
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2“evidence” is the medium or means by which a fact is proved or disproved’.3 Digital, or 
electronic, evidence is any probative material stored or transmitted in digital form, i.e. 
as series of the digits 0 and 1, which can be used in legal proceedings before a court in 
order to prove a fact according to the required standard of proof.4 It can be obtained 
from different sources including fixed computer hard drives, removable USB flash 
drives, mobile phones, satellites and the internet, and can have different forms, such as 
text documents (e.g. Word or Excel files, emails, instant messages and spreadsheets), 
maps, databases, digital images, video and audio files, GPS data, internet browser 
histories and metadata.5 Digital evidence can be open access, i.e. accessible by everyone 
without passwords or encryption, or available only to authorized users. 
In spite of its growing importance as a means of proof and the specific problems it 
presents, the use of digital evidence in inter-state litigation has been almost entirely 
neglected by international law scholarship.6 The present article aims to contribute to fill 
this gap. As it is not possible to identify uniform evidentiary rules applicable to all cases 
and before all international courts, due to limited space this article only focuses on 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and does not deal with digital 
evidence in proceedings before other international courts and tribunals or before 
domestic courts.7 Its conclusions, therefore, cannot automatically be extended to them.8 
3
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3This article’s purpose is to address certain issues that may arise from the 
production of digital evidence before the ICJ.9 It will start with a discussion of the 
application of the ICJ rules on documentary evidence to digital documents. It will then 
analyse the specific problems related to the production of digital audiovisual evidence in 
ICJ proceedings. Finally, the last Section will examine whether digital evidence 
unlawfully acquired through transborder access to data is an admissible means of proof 
before the Court. The article will focus on the contentious jurisdiction of the Court: 
indeed, there are no detailed evidentiary rules for advisory proceedings and Article 68 
of its Statute provides, as a general rule, that ‘[i]n the exercise of its advisory function 
the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in 
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognises them to be applicable’.10 
Furthermore, the article will primarily look at proceedings in the merits: the nature of 
most preliminary objections as to admissibility of a claim before the ICJ is such that 
they will not normally turn on a detailed assessment of the evidence.11 In any case, 
when deciding on preliminary objections, the Court does not normally rule on the 
evidence as such, but rather proceeds to assess the objection on the assumption that the 
allegations in the claim are true.
2. Digital evidence as documentary evidence
9
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102(3)). The text of the Rules of Court is at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&>. It should be noted that, while advisory proceedings are 
normally divided into written and oral phases as in contentious ones, the Court could dispense with both 
should it consider that it possesses sufficient information to give the advisory opinion (A Riddell and B 
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4 
In the absence of a customary international law of evidence, whether or not digital 
evidence may be used before an international court depends entirely on the procedural 
rules of each court, which differ considerably from one to another. Rules on the 
production of evidence before the ICJ are contained in the ICJ Statute (Articles 48-52), 
the Rules of Court (adopted in 1978 according to Article 30 of the Statute), and the non-
binding Practice Directions additional to the Rules for use by states appearing before the 
Court, first issued in 2001 and subsequently amended.12 With the exception of Practice 
Direction IX bis, none of these documents explicitly refers to digital evidence. There is 
also no exhaustive list of the means of proof available to parties to cases before the 
Court or any indication of their different probative weight.13
As a commentator has observed, ‘[t]he International Court of Justice has 
construed the absence of restrictive rules in its Statute to mean that a party may 
generally produce any evidence as a matter of right, so long as it is produced within the 
time limits fixed by the Court’.14 The basic rule, then, is that all evidence is, in 
principle, admissible.15 As to the probative value of the evidence so produced, in 
Nicaragua the Court solemnly emphasized the principle of the free assessment of 
evidence, stating that ‘within the limits of its Statute and Rules, [it] has freedom in 
estimating the value of the various elements of evidence’.16 In other words, the ICJ is 
free to request or admit any evidence, including that in digital form, and to give it the 
probative value it deems appropriate.
Digital evidence belongs to the broader category of documentary (as opposed to 
oral) evidence, which includes ‘all information submitted by the parties in support of 
the contentions contained in the pleadings other than expert and witness testimony’, 
12
 All the above documents are reproduced on the Court’s website at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4>.
13
 The statutes and rules of international criminal tribunals, on the other hand, provide for more specific 
evidentiary rules (Wolfrum (n 2) 567-569).
14
 DV Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals (University Press of Virginia 1975) 184. A 
general requirement of good faith can be said to apply to the taking of evidence by the parties (see, eg, 
Preamble, IBA Rules (n 6) para 3).
15
 There are, however, limitations to this general principle: see Riddell and Plant (n 10) 153-158. The 
Court does not hold specific preliminary proceedings in order to assess the admissibility of the 
evidentiary materials produced by the litigants unless they are specifically challenged by a party: what it 
does is consider any issues arising from the production of such evidence together with its probative value 
(Riddell and Plant (n 10) 53).
16
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Merits), [1986], ICJ Rep, para 60. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Uganda), [2005], ICJ Rep, para 59.
5whatever its form.17 Most national legislation does not discriminate between electronic 
evidence and physical evidence: ‘[w]hile approaches vary, many countries consider this 
good practice, as it ensures fair admissibility alongside all other types of evidence’.18 
Electronic documents, therefore, are in principle equivalent to paper documents, and 
electronic mail equivalent to traditional postal mail.19
While there is no formal hierarchy between different means of proof, the ICJ has 
taken a civil law court approach and has normally given primacy to documentary over 
oral evidence.20 The Court has the power to call upon the parties to produce any 
documents it deems necessary or to seek such evidence itself,21 but it has generally 
refrained from doing so and has relied on that spontaneously produced by the litigants.22 
Indeed, all documents not ‘readily available’23 must be produced by the interested party: 
certified copies of any document relied upon by the parties in support of their 
contentions in the pleading must be annexed to the original of the pleading.24 As already 
noted, unless the other party challenges the authenticity of the evidence the Court is 
likely to assume that the digital evidence produced is authentic, and will not go through 
any formal process of authentication.25 
17
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6If the authenticity is challenged, it is for the litigant producing the evidence to 
prove its reliability.26 In particular, it will have to demonstrate authentication and chain 
of custody of the digital evidence in question. Authentication aims to determine that 
digital evidence has not been altered or manipulated and can occur through external 
indicators such as live witnesses, expert testimony or other documentary evidence, or 
internal indicators, like timestamps and metadata.27 Chain of custody is ‘[t]he 
movement and location of … evidence, and the history of those persons who had it in 
their custody, from the time it is obtained to the time it is presented in court’.28 
The challenged digital evidence’s probative weight will depend on the 
demonstration by the litigant that it is authentic, accurate and complete, that its sources 
have been securely identified and that it has not been compromised.29 A litigant, 
however, may refuse to explain the sources and procedures through which it obtained 
the digital evidence it has submitted:30 while there are no sanctions for this, the litigant 
in question will bear the risk that the evidence is excluded or given reduced weight and 
that the facts it claims will not be considered sufficiently proved. 
According to Article 56 of the Rules of Court, ‘[a]fter the closure of the written 
proceedings, no further documents may be submitted to the Court by either party except 
with the consent of the other party’ or, in the absence of such consent, if the Court, after 
hearing the parties, deems the document necessary.31 Article 56(4), however, introduces 
26
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coincide with the time of the event itself).
28
 BA Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed (2014) 277-278.
29
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for instance, declined a request by the Defence to admit into 
evidence two alleged US diplomatic cables found on the Wikileaks website. The Tribunal looked at other 
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documents is admissible (Prosecutor v Salim Jamil Ayyash et al, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, STL-11-
01, Trial Chamber, Decision on the admissibility of documents published on the Wikileaks website, 21 
May 2015, paras 33-34). The Tribunal found that the Defence had failed to prove that the Wikileaks 
documents were authentic US diplomatic cables and that they accurately described the events they 
referred to (ibid, para 40). In fact, the sworn testimonies of two witnesses had denied their content (ibid, 
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litigants should refrain from submitting new documents after the conclusion of the written proceedings 
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7an exception to this rule and provides that reference may be made in the oral 
proceedings to documents not formally produced during the written proceedings 
providing that they are ‘part of a publication readily available’. Practice Direction IX 
bis, adopted in December 2006, takes note of the fact that documents can now also be 
published in digital form and provides that ‘readily available’ publications are any 
documents ‘available in the public domain … in any format (printed or electronic), form 
(physical or on-line, such as posted on the internet) or on any data medium (on paper, 
on digital or any other media) [that] should be accessible in either of the official 
languages of the Court’ and which it is possible to consult ‘within a reasonably short 
period of time’.32 In case the other litigant objects to the reference to a document in the 
oral proceedings, ‘the matter shall be settled by the Court’.33 Publications ‘readily 
available’ on the internet, then, may be referred to by the litigants in the oral 
proceedings without prior notice to the Court or the other litigant. The fact that 
documents on the internet can be accessed by anyone could make a potentially 
enormous amount of information ‘readily available’: as has been observed, this ‘would 
increase uncertainty in proceedings and does not allow a party to prepare its cases 
effectively without notice of the documents on which the other party would rely’.34 It is 
submitted, however, that not all internet publications are ipso facto ‘readily available’. 
As Article 56(2) of the Rules of Court makes clear, the availability of a document is not 
to be assessed in abstracto, but in relation to the Court and the other litigant in each 
specific case. When assessing whether an internet publication is ‘readily available’ in a 
particular case, the Court should take into account factors like, for instance, the 
language in which it is written, whether the document is in a widely available format 
(like MS-Word and PDF), whether it is open access and whether it has been suitably 
indexed by a popular search engine.35 It is also worth pointing out that the fact that a 
publication is ‘readily available’ does not necessarily render the concerned facts public 
knowledge of which the Court may take judicial notice: it only relieves the party from 
the closure of the written proceedings is not subordinated to the consent of the other litigant or the 
authorisation of the Court (Talmon (n 24) 1117).
32
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33
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34
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8the burden of having to produce the publication during the written proceedings.36 The 
facts, however, still need to be proved.
3. Specific issues related to the production of digital audiovisual evidence
Documents also include audiovisual materials.37 There are no specific rules for this type 
of materials in the ICJ Statute or Rules of Court and they are therefore produced and 
assessed in accordance with the general rules applicable to all documentary evidence. 
Digital photographs, maps, graphics and other visual evidence can be submitted in hard 
copy as annexes to the written pleadings in accordance to the procedural rules for the 
submission of documents. The resources that cannot be turned into hard copy 
documents can be presented to the Court during the oral proceedings.38 A copy of all 
audiovisual evidence constituting a ‘document’, however, should normally be deposited 
in the Registry together with the pleadings before the closure of the written proceedings.
39
 If this has not been done and there is no consent of the other litigant to its production, 
the evidence may be admitted only if the Court deems it necessary or if the document is 
part of a readily available publication.40
Although this largely depends on the issue in the case, the Court has generally 
attached less probative weight to audiovisual materials than to written documents. The 
Court has been particularly concerned with the authenticity of audiovisual evidence and 
the purpose of its production.41 To address these concerns, Practice Direction IX quater 
provides that ‘[a] party’s request to present audio-visual or photographic material must 
be accompanied by information as to the source of the material, the circumstances and 
date of its making and the extent to which it is available to the public. The party in 
question must also specify, wherever relevant, the geographic co-ordinates at which that 
material was taken’. Authenticity and authorship of digital audiovisual evidence may be 
difficult to establish with sufficient certainty: think, for instance, of videos uploaded on 
YouTube or pictures appearing on Instagram or Twitter. In fact, digital images are not 
real pictures, but data that need to be interpreted and processed. Metadata indicating the 
time the image was captured and the location of the scene can be manipulated and, 
36
 M Benzing, ‘Evidentiary Issues’, in Zimmermann, Oellers-Frahm, Tomuschat and Tams (n 24) 1241.
37
 Wolfrum (n 2) 558-559; Talmon (n 24) 1116.
38
 Riddell and Plant (n 10) 284.
39
 Art 56(1) of the Rules of Court. On when audiovisual materials constitute ‘documents’ in the sense of 
art 56 of the Rules of Court, see Talmon (n 24) 1140-1141.
40
 Art 56(2) and (4) of the Rules of Court.
41
 Riddell and Plant (n 10) 287.
9unlike in traditional pictures, the manipulation is not easily identifiable.42 In 
consideration of this problem, some NGOs have developed mobile device ‘applications’ 
for citizen policing that record geolocation and other important information and allow 
the user to upload pictures and videos. The eyeWitness Project, for instance, has created 
and released an ‘app’ produced by the International Bar Association and the legal 
services of LexisNexis where digital evidence of international crimes can be safely 
stored.43 The ‘app’ permits capture of photos and videos with embedded metadata 
showing the place and time of the collection and confirming that no alteration has taken 
place. After submission, the images and related data are encrypted and stored in a 
database, where they are analysed by legal experts who then liaise with relevant 
international, regional and national jurisdictions to ensure that the images are used to 
bring to justice those who have committed international crimes.44 Even though these 
applications have been developed with criminal law proceedings in mind, they (and 
similar ones) may be useful also before the ICJ.
Digital images and maps can also be taken remotely by satellites. Remote sensing, 
or Earth Observation (EO), is ‘the science of extracting information from an object 
through the analysis of data acquired by a sensor that is not in direct contact with the 
area’.45 Like any other documentary evidence, satellite imagery and maps may be 
presented by the litigants or requested by the Court under Article 49 of its Statute. In the 
oral proceedings in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, for instance, Judge Ranjeva 
requested satellite images from both litigants in order to assist the Court in its 
deliberation.46 In Cameroon v. Nigeria (Preliminary Objections), Nigeria submitted to 
the ICJ a satellite image of the disputed area to demonstrate its location.47 In Qatar v. 
Bahrain, Qatar produced several satellite images although Bahrain contested its analysis 
of an image of the shoal of Qit’at Jaradah and the method by which it had been created.
48
 In Oil Platforms, the United States submitted images from US reconnaissance 
42
 M Williams, ‘Satellite Evidence in International Institutions’, in Purdy and Leung (n 6) 201.
43
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45
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Innovation in Human Rights Monitoring Working Paper (August 2012), 2, 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/RemoteSensingAsEvidencePaper.pdf>.
46
 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Pleadings, CR1999/3, 69. In its Counter-
memorial, Botswana had already submitted several satellite images and had relied on them in its 
arguments ([1999], ICJ Rep, paras 29, 36).
47
 Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (Preliminary Objections), Pleadings, CR 1998/1, para 30, 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/4833.pdf>. The image was not relied on by Nigeria in the merits 
phase, although it annexed other satellite images to its Counter-memorial.
48
 Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar 
v Bahrain), Pleadings, CR 2000/9, 51, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/5467.pdf>.
10
satellites to refute Iran’s claim that there were no missiles in the Faw area and supported 
the images with expert testimony during the oral proceedings in the merits.49 The 
United States, however, refrained from submitting high resolution satellite images for 
national security reasons, but argued that reducing the resolution of the original images 
had not affected their integrity.50 In the end, the Court did not find the images 
sufficiently clear.51 In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ relied on a UN report that 
based its findings, inter alia, on satellite photos.52 Georgia also relied on satellite 
imagery to prove that Russian forces were present in the disputed region and that ethnic 
cleansing was occurring there.53 In Pulp Mills, Argentina referred to various satellite 
images showing the concentration of chlorophyll in the River Uruguay.54 In Aerial 
Herbicides Spraying, Colombia submitted extensive satellite evidence, using false 
colour renderings to show vegetation, in some cases overlaid with the GPS tracks of the 
spray flights.55 In Certain Activities (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Costa Rica relied on 
satellite imagery in order to show that Nicaragua had dug the caño and cleared 
vegetation.56
Like any other audiovisual evidence, satellite images and maps must be presented 
by the litigants either as annexes to the written pleadings or during the oral proceedings: 
in the latter case, they may be excluded because of the opposition of the other litigant.57 
This is so unless the satellite images are ‘readily available’ in the sense of Article 56(4) 
of the Rules of Court, for instance when they can be easily found on the internet as in 
the case of Google Earth images. In Nicaragua v. Honduras, Honduras produced a 
satellite image in the oral proceedings arguing that it should not be considered a ‘new 
document’ because it was readily available on the internet.58 It is not clear whether the 
Judgment accepted Honduras’s claim.
49
 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits), Counter-Memorial and 
Counter-Claim of the United States of America, 23 June 1997, 48-49, <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/90/8632.pdf>.
50
 Oil Platforms, US Counter-memorial and Counter-claim (n 49) 49, footnote 125.
51
 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits), [2003], ICJ Rep, para 58.
52
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Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits), [2007], ICJ Rep, para 229.
53
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54
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Satellite evidence is the result of a process that includes several stages: raw data 
are collected by satellites and sent to ground stations, where they are processed and 
made available in digital form as well as enhanced, if need be, through the use of 
computers.59 If the raw data, at least in their initial stage, cannot be modified, 
manipulation can occur at the interpretation stage and may be difficult to detect.60 In 
practice, however, the certificate of authenticity from the Agent is taken at face value 
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expert report by the geographer who had created the images, which explained the 
process undertaken to create them. However, the chain of custody was limited to stating 
that he had received the images from the commercial provider and that he had 
subsequently performed the relevant manipulations.61 
Litigants could of course disagree on the accuracy and reliability of satellite 
imagery, both in relation to how the image was constructed from raw data and to how 
the image was interpreted.62 In such cases, the parties will normally put forward 
competing expert evidence on the question.63 Indeed, even though, according to Article 
50 of the ICJ Statute, ‘[t]he Court may, at any time, entrust any individual body, bureau, 
commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an 
enquiry or giving an expert opinion’,64  it will normally decide any issue on the basis of 
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of advisors that could assist it in the evaluation of digital evidence. It would not be the 
first international court to do so: in 2013, the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) hired an expert in digital forensics for its Scientific 
Response Unit to improve its ability to collect and analyse digital evidence.66
4. Is illegally obtained digital evidence admissible?
While remote sensing from satellites is generally not deemed to be a violation of 
international law,67 the legality of unauthorized ‘transborder access’68 by the 
investigative authorities of a state to data stored in another state is dubious. In addition 
to issues related to data protection and the privacy of any individuals whose data are 
accessed, transborder access is an ‘exercise of power’69 by a state performed on the 
territory of another state whenever the data are stored in computer systems physically 
located on the territory of that state, even if the data are accessed remotely.70 Article 32 
of the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime addresses the problem and provides 
that ‘[a] Party may, without the authorisation of another Party: a) access publicly 
available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located 
geographically; or b) access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, 
stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and 
voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the 
Party through that computer system’.71 It has been suggested that at least the first case 
66
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identified in Article 32, that of publicly accessible data (ie without the need for 
passwords or authorisations), reflects customary international law.72 On the other hand, 
Article 32(b) seems to be opposable only to parties to the Cybercrime Convention.73 
Under customary international law, outside the case of open source data, the consent of 
the affected person (be it the user or the internet service provider or another subject) is 
not sufficient to allow unilateral transborder search by foreign authorities: the 
competent organs of the territorial state must authorise the search, without which 
transborder access is a violation of the sovereignty of the territorial state.74 
Is digital evidence collected by a litigant through unauthorised transborder access 
admissible before the ICJ? There is no express rule in the Court’s Statute providing that 
evidence obtained through a violation of international law is inadmissible.75 It is also 
not a general principle of law, as it seems to be a rule essentially confined to the US 
criminal system.76 As Thirlway argues, the rule in domestic legal systems is motivated 
by the need to protect the defendant against the wider powers of the prosecutor and its 
possible abuses: in inter-state litigation, there is no criminal trial and no dominant party, 
as the litigants are states which are formally in a position of sovereign equality.77 In the 
Corfu Channel case, the United Kingdom claimed that its actions in Albania could be 
justified on ‘a new and special application of the theory of intervention, by means of 
which the State intervening would secure possession of evidence in the territory of 
another State, in order to submit it to an international tribunal and thus facilitate its 
task’.78 While the ICJ rejected this defence, it did not dismiss the evidence illegally 
obtained by the United Kingdom in Operation Retail; on the contrary, it relied on it in 
72
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order to determine the place of the accident and the nature of the mines.79 In fact, 
Albania never challenged the admissibility of the evidence acquired by the British 
Navy,80 and the Court did not address the question. What it found was that the purpose 
of gathering evidence did not exclude the illegality of certain conduct of the United 
Kingdom.81 In the digital context, by analogy this means that the fact that digital 
evidence is stored in the computers or servers located in another state does not entitle 
the interested litigant to access them without authorization from the competent 
authorities in order to submit the evidence in the proceedings. If the evidence is 
unlawfully collected, however, it is unlikely that it will be considered inadmissible by 
the ICJ on grounds of its illegality alone. The probative weight of the collected evidence 
will also not depend on whether it was collected legally or illegally, but on the 
demonstration of its authenticity and accuracy. While the Court’s liberal approach with 
regard to the admissibility and probative value of evidence illegally collected may at 
first sight be seen as a possible challenge to international legality as it could encourage 
such practice, this should be seen in the context of the consensual characteristics of 
international litigation, where the disputants are states in a position of sovereign 
equality: as Thirlway observes, ‘a state adducing evidence obtained by means that could 
be challenged would run the risk not merely of seeing the evidence in question 
excluded, but also of a finding of fact against it of, in effect, international responsibility 
on the basis of a purely incidental jurisdiction of a procedurally interlocutory nature. 
The inconsistency of such a structure with the basically consensual nature of 
international jurisdiction is flagrant’.82
5. Conclusions
As the ICJ approaches its seventieth anniversary, it is easy to predict that, with the 
progresses and wider availability of technology, digital evidence will be increasingly 
used before it. As has been seen, however, the production of digital evidence raises 
certain questions, some of which have been addressed in this article.
The fact remains that, apart from one exception, there are no rules or directions 
that specifically address the production and assessment of digital evidence in 
proceedings before the ICJ. De lege ferenda, should the production of digital evidence 
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in ICJ proceedings be specifically regulated, or should the general rules on evidence 
continue to apply to it? Although – as has been argued in this article - the absence of 
specific rules and procedures for digital evidence is not necessarily an obstacle to its 
production and evaluation, it is unquestionable that adopting specific regulations that 
take into account the peculiarities of digital evidence would help the ICJ judges and the 
litigants make a more effective use of this increasingly important means of proof. The 
Court, therefore, could amend its Rules or adopt Practice Directions specifically 
addressing issues related to digital evidence, as already happened with Practice 
Direction IX bis. Having said that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the 
way in which authenticity and chain of custody of digital evidence are to be established, 
the particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is 
doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.
